Complementary Slackness

Lemma 2

Assume a linear program $P = \max\{c^T x \mid Ax \le b; x \ge 0\}$ has solution x^* and its dual $D = \min\{b^T y \mid A^T y \ge c; y \ge 0\}$ has solution y^* .

- **1.** If $x_i^* > 0$ then the *j*-th constraint in *D* is tight.
- **2.** If the *j*-th constraint in *D* is not tight than $x_i^* = 0$.
- **3.** If $y_i^* > 0$ then the *i*-th constraint in *P* is tight.
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If we say that a variable x_j^* (y_i^*) has slack if $x_j^* > 0$ ($y_i^* > 0$), (i.e., the corresponding variable restriction is not tight) and a contraint has slack if it is not tight, then the above says that for a primal-dual solution pair it is not possible that a constraint **and** its corresponding (dual) variable has slack.



Proof: Complementary Slackness

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From the constraint of the dual it follows that $y^T A \ge c^T$. Hence the left hand side is a sum over the product of non-negative numbers. Hence, if e.g. $(y^T A - c^T)_j > 0$ (the *j*-th constraint in the dual is not tight) then $x_j = 0$ (2.). The result for (1./3./4.) follows similarly.



Brewer: find mix of ale and beer that maximizes profits

Entrepeneur: buy resources from brewer at minimum cost C, H, M: unit price for corn, hops and malt.

Note that brewer won't sell (at least not all) if e.g. 5C + 4H + 35M < 13 as then brewing ale would be advantageous.

Brewer: find mix of ale and beer that maximizes profits

 $\max 13a + 23b$ s.t. $5a + 15b \le 480$ $4a + 4b \le 160$ $35a + 20b \le 1190$ $a, b \ge 0$

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min	480 <i>C</i>	+	160H	+	1190M	
s.t.	5 <i>C</i>	+	4H	+	35 <i>M</i>	≥ 13
	15 <i>C</i>	+	4H	+	20 <i>M</i>	≥ 23
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Marginal Price:

- How much money is the brewer willing to pay for additional amount of Corn, Hops, or Malt?
- We are interested in the marginal price, i.e., what happens if we increase the amount of Corn, Hops, and Malt by ε_C, ε_H, and ε_M, respectively.

The profit increases to $\max\{c^T x \mid Ax \le b + \varepsilon; x \ge 0\}$. Because of strong duality this is equal to

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \min & (b^T + \epsilon^T) y \\ \text{s.t.} & A^T y &\geq c \\ & y &\geq 0 \end{array}$$



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If ϵ is "small" enough then the optimum dual solution γ^* might not change. Therefore the profit increases by $\sum_i \epsilon_i \gamma_i^*$.

Therefore we can interpret the dual variables as marginal prices.

- If the brewer has slack of some resource (e.g. corn) then he is not willing to pay anything for it (corresponding dual variable is zero).
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



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
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
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
















The change in profit when increasing hops by one unit is $= c_B^T A_B^{-1} e_h$.



The change in profit when increasing hops by one unit is $=\underbrace{c_B^T A_B^{-1}}_{\gamma^*}e_h.$ Of course, the previous argument about the increase in the primal objective only holds for the non-degenerate case.

If the optimum basis is degenerate then increasing the supply of one resource may not allow the objective value to increase.



Definition 3

An (s, t)-flow in a (complete) directed graph $G = (V, V \times V, c)$ is a function $f : V \times V \mapsto \mathbb{R}_0^+$ that satisfies

1. For each edge (x, y)

 $0 \leq f_{xy} \leq c_{xy}$.

(capacity constraints)

2. For each $v \in V \setminus \{s, t\}$

$$\sum_{x} f_{vx} = \sum_{x} f_{xv} \; .$$

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5.5 Interpretation of Dual Variables

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Definition 4 The value of an (s, t)-flow f is defined as

$$\operatorname{val}(f) = \sum_{X} f_{SX} - \sum_{X} f_{XS} .$$

Maximum Flow Problem: Find an (s,t)-flow with maximum value.



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max		$\sum_{z} f_{sz} - \sum_{z} f_{zs}$			
s.t.	$\forall (z, w) \in V \times V$	f_{zw}	\leq	C_{ZW}	ℓ_{zw}
	$\forall w \neq s, t$	$\sum_{z} f_{zw} - \sum_{z} f_{wz}$	=	0	p_w
		f_{zw}	\geq	0	

min		$\sum_{(xy)} c_{xy} \ell_{xy}$		
s.t.	$f_{xy}(x, y \neq s, t)$:	$1\ell_{xy}-1p_x+1p_y$	\geq	0
	$f_{sy}(y \neq s,t)$:	$1\ell_{sy}$ $+1p_y$	\geq	1
	$f_{xs} (x \neq s, t)$:	$1\ell_{xs}-1p_x$	\geq	-1
	$f_{ty}(y \neq s,t)$:	$1\ell_{ty}$ $+1p_y$	\geq	0
	$f_{xt} (x \neq s, t)$:	$1\ell_{xt}-1p_x$	\geq	0
	f_{st} :	$1\ell_{st}$	\geq	1
	f_{ts} :	$1\ell_{ts}$	\geq	-1
		ℓ_{xy}	\geq	0





5.5 Interpretation of Dual Variables

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with $p_t = 0$ and $p_s = 1$.



5.5 Interpretation of Dual Variables

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min		$\sum_{(xy)} c_{xy} \ell_{xy}$		
s.t.	f_{xy} :	$1\ell_{xy}-1p_x+1p_y$	\geq	0
		ℓ_{xy}	\geq	0
		p_s	=	1
		p_t	=	0

We can interpret the ℓ_{xy} value as assigning a length to every edge.

The value p_x for a variable, then can be seen as the distance of x to t (where the distance from s to t is required to be 1 since $p_s = 1$).

The constraint $p_x \leq \ell_{xy} + p_y$ then simply follows from triangle inequality $(d(x,t) \leq d(x,y) + d(y,t) \Rightarrow d(x,t) \leq \ell_{xy} + d(y,t))$.



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One can show that there is an optimum LP-solution for the dual problem that gives an integral assignment of variables.

This means $p_x = 1$ or $p_x = 0$ for our case. This gives rise to a cut in the graph with vertices having value 1 on one side and the other vertices on the other side. The objective function then evaluates the capacity of this cut.

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